Residual risk
Even if every control on the earlier pages works as designed, Glitr does not become a finished, audited messenger. This page is the leftover, and the claims we will not make. The dated executive view — Glitr bar vs ideal-messenger gaps — is the report. This page stays the leftover catalog.
The app is shared for testing, feedback, and demo. Do not put sensitive details in it.
Non-goals
| Claim | Why it is out |
|---|---|
| Anonymity | Roadmap lists it. Product docs disclaim it. A host still sees activity, access, and IPs. Tor SOCKS changes the git IP, not the fact of a mailbox. |
| Signal-app compatibility | The libraries are spec-faithful and educational. They are not wire-compatible with the Signal app. |
| Formal verification of the messenger | Four libraries have tests, models, and stub type-checks. That does not compose into a proof of send, poll, git delivery, or a stolen host. |
| Safety against a compromised endpoint | Malware, a hostile OS, a browser extension, or an unlocked session reads what the app can read. |
| Safety against a host who has your password | Password sealing is one job. Handing the host the unlock secret ends that job. |
| Nation-state “safe forever” | Not a product target. Closed-source and unaudited on purpose at this stage. |
Residual list
| Residual | Where it lives |
|---|---|
| Closed-source messenger; no independent audit | This site, the roadmap, the verification report |
Unlock password and git tokens are not persisted in glitr:connect (GUI/TUI scrub) | Devices and storage, GLITR-2026-013 |
| User-supplied CORS proxy on the web git path | Git mailbox — no default public proxy |
| Public STUN and ICE IP leakage (per-contact STUN prefs; media still not over Tor) | Live links, GLITR-2026-003 |
Plaintext wu1: / on1: invites | Live links, Tor |
| Live control frames (typing, receipts, call signaling) are DTLS-only | Live links |
| Live WebRTC ICE/media does not ride Tor (signaling may prefer onion) | Live links, Tor |
| Pair now / onion have no git fallback | Live links, Tor |
| Service worker + static host / GitHub Pages supply chain (isomorphic-git same-origin) | Platforms (web), GLITR-2026-020 |
document::eval webview bridges (CSP allows unsafe-eval) | Platforms (desktop / PWA) |
| Host metadata, collaborators, terms of service | Git mailbox |
| Git cannot consume one-time prekeys like a prekey server | Git mailbox, data structures; pool + rotate exist (Cryptography) |
| Groups are fan-out on git only | Git mailbox |
| Mobile and mobile-Tor are not claimed product paths | Platforms, Tor |
| Side channels, compromised RNG, implementation bugs | Not modeled. Not independently audited. In-house notes: Security audit |
How this relates to formal verification
Library pages use Tested / Modeled / Type-checked / Assumed / Open. This folder uses Documented / Mitigated / Partial / Open. The words are not interchangeable.
ProVerif in this stack is a Dolev–Yao network attacker plus honest endpoints and oracle primitives. The verification report attacker table says the host and the git mailbox are not modeled. Discussing them here does not put them in those models.
Cascade composition in crypto-cascade is a modeled layer order. It is not a proof of Glitr, git delivery, or a stolen laptop.
Audit status
- Independent security audit of the messenger: not done.
- An in-house implementation review is on Security audit. It does not close the independent-audit row.
- In-house or AI-authored notes are not a substitute. The roadmap FAQ says the same.
- Signal Protocol source is public.
ml-kem,pqxdh,mls,crypto,api,db,git,webrtc,tor, and the client are not. Cascade includes pairwise MLS per contact; groups use N-partyGroupSessionwith per-member delivery seals (still git fan-out for transport).
If your threat model needs a reviewed, open messenger, this is the wrong app today.
Older writing
An earlier Enkrypted chapter used a different product (signaling broker, TURN, federated modules). Do not copy those claims onto Glitr. The useful leftovers were the outline — adversaries, assets, scenarios, STRIDE, residual — not the rows.
The user-facing one-liner remains on encryption visibility.
Start of this folder: Threat model.